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PAPod 524 - Unlocking Organizational Effectiveness with Edgar Schein

PreAccident Investigation Podcast

The Pre Accident Podcast is an ongoing discussion of Human Performance, Systems Safety, & Safety Culture.

Show Notes

In this captivating episode of the Pre-Accident Podcast, host Todd Conklin welcomes the legendary Edgar Schein and his son Peter for a deep dive into the world of organizational culture and safety. This is part one of a two-part series that promises to challenge your thinking and spark new insights.



Listeners are treated to an enlightening conversation with Edgar Schein, a revered figure in the field of organizational development, as he shares his distilled wisdom gathered over decades of academic and consulting work. Schein emphasizes the critical importance of openness and trust in driving both safety and effectiveness within organizations, drawing from his extensive experiences with major corporations and industries.



The episode explores the concept of relationship building within management, challenging traditional notions of role-based relationships and advocating for a more personal and trust-based approach. The discussion touches on the nuances of creating psychological safety, the impact of reward systems, and the often overlooked role of middle management in fostering a culture of safety and effectiveness.



Join Todd Conklin and his distinguished guests for an engaging conversation that will leave you eagerly anticipating the next installment. Tune in to discover how openness and trust can transform your organization and why these elements are the bedrock of true effectiveness.


Show Transcript

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Hey, everybody. Welcome to the Free Accident Podcast. I'm Todd Conklin. How are you?

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So before I even roll out the opening credit stuff, today is a big day.

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Actually, it's part one of a two-part big day.

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Does that make sense? Probably. Enough. You know, enough. You'll be fine.

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I got to spend an entire day with Edgar Schein, and actually his son Peter was with him as well.

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And he was completely cool and kind of excited about us recording it for the

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podcast so you could hear as well.

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So that's what today's podcast is. Part one of a two-parter.

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Get ready because I think your socks are about to be blown off your legs. How's it going?

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Music.

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Hi everybody todd conklin pre-accident podcast pre-investigate

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what is this called what are we you'd think after 500 of

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these you'd know what to call pre-accident investigation podcast that's

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it yeah i can't do

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it i cannot do it so you're about to enjoy the fabulous twinings of edgar shine

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fine get ready pumpkins it's good it's really good it's it's just such a treat

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to be to be with him and to hear him talk i one of my favorites i think i've

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talked about this before in the podcast one,

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of my very favorite things to do is be with these these academics as they enter

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the twilight of their careers and is that a nice way to say that yeah that's probably the best way.

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Because they've boiled away so much of the academic crap.

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So I don't know if you know, do you know the old joke about universities?

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People are so mean to each other

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in universities because the stakes are so low. That's the joke, right?

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The funny thing about academics is they're constantly sort of,

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the system is sort of incentivized to make everybody kind of an enemy.

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And what I love, and I got to see this with Edward T. Hall and just a whole

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bunch of incredible scholars.

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Ev Rogers was just a joy. is towards the end of their academic arc,

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I'm trying to think of gentle ways to say this, as they enter the next phase

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of their career and life,

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their thinking becomes so much more clear because they've sort of spent their

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entire career boiling their ideas down to these really quite remarkable statements.

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Like Edward T. Hall said, if you want to understand another culture, make a friend.

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I mean, that's an amazing, if you think about that, my life's work ended up

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on that phrase. That's a pretty cool phrase to end with.

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Ev Rogers was completely convinced at every level that communicating with one

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another was part of a larger system that involved really the whole person.

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And so we didn't communicate just in language, but we communicated in this entire package.

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And Edgar Schein has really boiled his thinking around organizations,

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culture, and safety to a great extent.

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Two words. I'm not going to tell you what those two words are because you'll

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get to hear them. I mean, I could tell them. I know them, but I'm not going to blab them out now.

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I don't want to say spoiler alert the two words are. That'd be cheesy.

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I just want to sit back and let you hear this conversation.

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Now, we're together with the folks at Chevron, and it was so sweet of them to

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invite a bunch of us to come see this.

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And we were talking about fatalities and serious injuries, which,

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you know, is a topic we probably need to spend a lot more time specifically

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throwing away the classic industrial safety conversation, the injuries and industrial harm things.

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They're important, but talking specifically about fatalities.

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And Shahika Korkmaz, who's a dear friend of mine, invited Edgar Schein.

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And Peter, his son, came with him. They traveled together. and he spent,

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gosh, a good hour and a half. You'll see, because it's the reason it's two podcasts.

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Just kind of talking about safety and how the world works and what in fact is going on.

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And I think you're going to find this conversation to be really interesting.

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It's fun. It's really good. I think the very best thing I can do is not feed

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you more information about my exciting summer, even though it's dwindling,

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almost it's over. I mean, we're into bluegrass time right now.

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I think the best thing I can do is sit back and relax and listen with you.

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And you'll hear Edgar Schein.

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And Peter's going to jump in

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once in a while talking about safety and fatalities and serious incidents.

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So here it is, the Pre-Accident Podcast gladly welcomes Edgar Schein another

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time. Sit back, relax, and enjoy.

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But it's a good lead-in to what what we want to discuss with you today,

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Instead of, you know, giving you a detailed analysis of how to think about culture,

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I really want to think about safety and improvement and effectiveness.

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My interest in this goes way back to the earliest organization development work,

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as some of you may or may not remember, was done in the oil industry. Exxon and SOChem.

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And those companies did a lot of, they put a lot of resources into their own improvement projects.

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They funded a lot of the management T groups that were operating in those days.

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Is Blake Mouton a name that still rings anywhere?

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They had a whole program that the oil companies were using for self-development.

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So it's interesting that that is not a common name anymore to you because at

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one time it was the thing to do,

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a self-administering one-week workshop that would work its way through all the layers of the company.

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And so anyway, it started there.

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And then as I started to be a consultant with Digital Equipment Corporation,

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they didn't really have a safety problem, but they have had effectiveness problems.

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And at the same time with Sibagygi, at that time, a big chemical conglomerate

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that then became pharmaceutical and is today Novartis.

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They clearly had safety issues, particularly with drugs.

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They produced the drug that produced all these unfortunate birth problems.

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So that's a very extreme form of a safety issue when you have a product.

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Produces something very undesirable and unwarranted.

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And then I got involved with Con Edison as a consultant for over 15 years.

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And that's where I've learned the most. Because when you look at a program like

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this as an outsider and don't look at a cross-section, okay,

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what are they doing right now? What is the current program?

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If you look at this across 15 years, you see all kinds of nuances that the cross-sectional

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analysis doesn't get you.

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So that got me very interested.

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And then I got involved around the culture issue with the nuclear industry,

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both in giving talks to the people in Vienna and then becoming a member of the advisory board of INPO.

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How many of you know about INPO?

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It should probably be most of you. It's a very ingenious device for an industry

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to create its own internal development organization,

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both to measure how we're doing and to provide teams that not only measure but

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then help to improve the organization.

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So for five or more years, I heard the stories of what was going on there.

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And they all lead to, I have about six points and then some handouts. The first main point.

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It's a very simple point, and I suspect,

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I hope I'm preaching to the choir that the common element in all these safety

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and effectiveness programs is that they are all driven by the same two fundamental ideas.

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Openness and trust.

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If you look at all the safety culture lists, you'll always find openness and

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trust somewhere on that list.

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And what from our point of view, if you look at this culturally,

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they are not only the most important ones, but in a certain sense, they are the only ones.

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Because all the other things you do don't really work very well if you don't

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have people that are open with each other and that trust each other.

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So the thing I am most concerned about is that.

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We get down into the trees

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and redesign the trees and the gardens and fertilizers and burn-offs and don't

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look at the forest and realize that the forest only works because of the synergy

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between openness and trust and how people relate to each other.

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Is that okay so far? Can you agree with me on that.

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So the first thing we have to solve is the trust and the openness problem.

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So all the programs I saw in Con Ed, and every few years they had a new program,

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and the safety people said, if you don't have a new program, you lose motivation.

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And you get, That is, some of you have seen that.

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And what is lost in that is why do we need a new program every few years?

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Because there's something missing.

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There's some underlying thing having to do with openness and trust that hasn't

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gotten embedded in the culture, or else we wouldn't need a new program.

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So point one is that safety and effectiveness are fundamentally the same.

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And point two is they all hinge openness and trust.

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So the Stanford right now, we're working with the hospital and the medical school

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on a variety of lean programs and improvement programs.

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Safety isn't right now the big issue. But what are all the improvement programs

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about and the quality programs?

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They're about trust and openness.

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So this convergence of effectiveness and safety is very important to get into your head.

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You're not working safety. You're working total organizational effectiveness.

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Can you live with that? Yes. Is it taken for granted or do I have to sell it to you?

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I'm in. We're with you.

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But i i mean it is worth noting that

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the world doesn't necessarily

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see it that way you might have to prove to them

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that this is the right way for the organization to think about it

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but the world is still going to have all sorts of regulatory bodies that are

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only focused on on you know fatalities and accidents but ed's point as as organizations

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what are the benefits of thinking of them as linked, as synergistic.

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All right. So now the question that the previous speaker of everyone asking you,

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what do you want me to do and how will I know how I'm doing are really fabulous

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questions for this very point.

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So the answer from our point of view is a high level of trust and openness is

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what I want you to achieve.

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And what I want you to do to get there is to develop a different relationship

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with your teammates, your boss, and your direct reports.

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All your human contacts have to go from something that in our books we introduce as level one, two,

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or three kind of relationship, where I guess we'll give you this first handout

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to explain what we mean by a level two relationship,

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that you can't have trust and openness if you don't have the right kind of human

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relationship, particularly with your direct reports.

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The most common situation that I encountered in Con Edison,

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I was part of a group, two environmental lawyers and me that were assigned to

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work for the board on improving environmental health and safety.

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But one of the things we did was we ran a lot of focus groups of electrical workers.

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And this was in the midst of Con Edison having, they were under indictment,

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they were on probation, so they had to work on this stuff.

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They were working very hard on it. And so we would have a focus group and we would say, well,

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you have this timeout program, and so if an electrical worker is down there

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under the sidewalk and sees a problem and it's unsafe, you're supposed to call a timeout. Sure.

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Does it work? Well, most of the time it works, but there are some problems.

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Well, what's the problem?

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Well, one of the problems is I tried telling my boss about this wiring didn't

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look very safe, and I could tell that he was being polite, but he wasn't really listening.

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Something in that immediate relationship wasn't working.

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The boss wasn't listening. Or he got annoyed with me because we were having too many timeouts.

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And his unit doesn't want to have more timeouts than the other units because

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they're measuring the hell out of the timeouts.

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So the measurement system under the transparency logic, which we're going to

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keep hammering is not the same as openness.

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Under the transparency logic, that supervisor is disadvantaged by knowing that

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he's got more timeouts than some other groups, and he kind of leaks that.

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To the employee, to the point where the employee says, well,

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this doesn't look quite safe to me, but I'm not sure I ought to call yet another timeout.

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You might get mad at me.

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So openness gets undermined in the most subtle way, even in the midst of a program.

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Or maybe what the what the worker saw is a deeper problem, a fellow worker doing something unsafe.

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And it's clear that the rules are you should report that.

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And in the focus groups, they would tell us, no way.

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You know, we're unionized. There is no way I'm going to report on a buddy.

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Just forget about it. That's not in the cards. Ain't going to happen.

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So again, what's the relationship between those two employees that would make

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them tolerate unsafe behavior because of another norm that's operating there?

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You never rat on a buddy. It's a very deep sort of a norm.

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So we've got to find a way to redefine the daily relationship between every

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boss and every direct report and every team member and the other team members.

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And the way we're doing that conceptually is to say the history of management

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has been way too focused on roles and role distance,

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that everyone has their job.

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They know what the job is. It's well described in the job description.

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And I'm your boss. My job is to supervise you.

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And I don't really want to get to know you. That might be uncomfortable.

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And yet getting to know you might be the only way to openness and trust.

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That's the big message. And it's a very difficult message because I think we're

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fighting all of management history.

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Management history is wedded to the idea of roles, role relations.

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You know your job. I know my job.

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Let's not get too personal here because then it might lead to nepotism.

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It might lead to other bad things.

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So what we're trying to describe in that handout is how level two differs from,

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from both a really negative relationship, what we call minus one,

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or the traditional role-based management

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relationship that I think most companies just

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buy into willy-nilly and not saying we want you to be intimate and saying there

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is a level of knowing who you're working with relevant to the job that you're

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doing that you have to achieve if safety, effectiveness.

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Openness, trust are your goal.

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And the reason for that is the work has gotten too complicated.

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You can't define roles so neatly anymore.

00:19:02.362 --> 00:19:05.262
Back in the assembly line day, you could do that.

00:19:05.442 --> 00:19:10.182
But when you look at what, like General McChrystal's team of teams,

00:19:10.402 --> 00:19:13.262
when he says, you know, when you're fighting that war in Afghanistan,

00:19:13.282 --> 00:19:17.482
you don't even know what the right roles are until you're out there.

00:19:17.882 --> 00:19:23.962
Or another better example even is we've done a lot of work with forestry department.

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When you're out there fighting these fires, the roles are constantly shifting.

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The work is constantly shifting. So what you really need to know is what's your buddy doing right now?

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And if the buddy is also my boss and we don't have a level two relationship,

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I don't know whether I can trust him.

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And he or she doesn't know whether they can tell me what's really going on.

00:19:54.522 --> 00:20:02.642
So we're pushing this concept. And it's a tricky one because it's so against management norms.

00:20:03.362 --> 00:20:08.142
Psychological distance is a good thing. You don't want to fraternize.

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You don't want to have to hurt your buddy and rat on him.

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And yet, the world is going into a set of tasks and structures and work situations that,

00:20:23.681 --> 00:20:30.221
where the roles are shifting and unclear, and even hierarchy is beginning to

00:20:30.221 --> 00:20:33.021
be unclear, how to manage hierarchy.

00:20:33.441 --> 00:20:39.541
So if we're heading into that world, I think we have a solid argument that you've

00:20:39.541 --> 00:20:46.421
got to somehow get to know your people at a deeper level than what is currently

00:20:46.421 --> 00:20:50.081
the normal management process.

00:20:50.521 --> 00:20:52.141
How do you react to that?

00:20:52.801 --> 00:20:55.861
Dr. Strong, you said transparency is not the same as openness.

00:20:56.781 --> 00:21:01.441
So in this situation, I think I'm going to use those words interchangeably,

00:21:01.561 --> 00:21:02.461
but they're not at a stake.

00:21:03.621 --> 00:21:10.361
Transparency is usually a management-directed set of numbers that we all should look at.

00:21:10.501 --> 00:21:16.101
We should make it clear what work we're doing and how we're measuring it.

00:21:16.101 --> 00:21:20.781
We're not going to hide the ball, right? We're going to share every metric.

00:21:21.381 --> 00:21:29.001
We might even share all of the performance measures of every single employee

00:21:29.001 --> 00:21:30.761
because we're completely transparent.

00:21:31.121 --> 00:21:35.921
But that's as much of a weapon as it is. It doesn't need necessarily create openness.

00:21:36.121 --> 00:21:41.661
No, I think that sort of weaponizes information, you know,

00:21:41.881 --> 00:21:50.501
because you end up with all of these sort of pathologies when you believe that

00:21:50.501 --> 00:21:53.721
that is going to really deeply influence performance.

00:21:54.781 --> 00:21:58.121
It creates new ways of hiding the ball.

00:21:59.421 --> 00:22:04.201
Because oftentimes, and again, And this is mostly speaking out of Silicon Valley,

00:22:04.421 --> 00:22:08.401
where there have been tons of experiments of this kind of thing,

00:22:08.521 --> 00:22:10.401
you know, the transparent organization.

00:22:11.481 --> 00:22:16.861
But it's a different philosophy, and it tends to be driven from the top down.

00:22:17.021 --> 00:22:21.461
We will be transparent. It's sort of cascaded down through the organization.

00:22:21.761 --> 00:22:27.561
That's quite different than openness. And we'll get into it more,

00:22:27.781 --> 00:22:34.901
unless should we? No, I think let's push on with examples.

00:22:35.281 --> 00:22:43.781
I mean, the example I gave you of the electrical worker ending up saying,

00:22:43.781 --> 00:22:48.001
there's no point telling my boss, that's a loss of openness.

00:22:48.501 --> 00:22:56.721
Openness is when every employee down in the trenches who sees something that ought to be attended to.

00:22:58.481 --> 00:23:04.221
Feels psychologically safe to go to somebody and say, I'm a little worried this

00:23:04.221 --> 00:23:09.481
valve doesn't feel quite the same way, you know, as it usually does.

00:23:10.461 --> 00:23:16.661
Openness is creating an environment where that employee will say, well, I'm not sure.

00:23:16.981 --> 00:23:21.301
It's a weak signal, but I think I ought to tell somebody.

00:23:22.304 --> 00:23:28.124
That's what's missing, isn't it, in most safety programs, that willingness of

00:23:28.124 --> 00:23:32.864
everyone to point to things that might be going wrong.

00:23:33.264 --> 00:23:40.964
Because that's what often the accident review discovers, that there were all

00:23:40.964 --> 00:23:42.304
kinds of little signals.

00:23:42.784 --> 00:23:48.204
Somebody saw something that they didn't bother to mention. And had they mentioned

00:23:48.204 --> 00:23:50.124
it, the whole chain would have been different.

00:23:50.564 --> 00:23:56.824
At least in the nuclear situation, for them, that's critical.

00:23:57.224 --> 00:24:01.364
They can't afford to have anything anywhere not be mentioned.

00:24:01.504 --> 00:24:09.764
But even there, it's hard to teach everybody that it's okay to waste time to

00:24:09.764 --> 00:24:13.884
tell stuff that might be a very irrelevant, weak signal.

00:24:13.884 --> 00:24:21.824
So, where it comes down to where this level two relationship is most important

00:24:21.824 --> 00:24:26.704
and most missing, by the way, is in middle management.

00:24:27.084 --> 00:24:35.344
Because middle management is living in a world of schedules.

00:24:36.084 --> 00:24:39.104
Productivity, career competition.

00:24:39.104 --> 00:24:46.904
And so no matter how much the board and senior management says we really are

00:24:46.904 --> 00:24:48.924
concerned about safety,

00:24:48.924 --> 00:24:58.304
I could tell talking to middle managers that that was not really their daily reward system.

00:24:58.544 --> 00:25:03.324
Their daily reward system was not how many employees told them problems.

00:25:03.544 --> 00:25:07.344
Their daily reward system was whether they got the job done or not.

00:25:07.344 --> 00:25:13.484
So the schedule, and if you look at all the big accidents, all the Challenger

00:25:13.484 --> 00:25:21.744
and so on, it was schedule that was overriding the data that some of the engineers were providing.

00:25:22.204 --> 00:25:27.784
They had the data that the O-rings might freeze up, but the politics and the

00:25:27.784 --> 00:25:33.864
schedule and the reward system were at that point not about absolute safety.

00:25:33.864 --> 00:25:41.584
They were about, let's try it out anyway, because politically we'll run the risk.

00:25:41.724 --> 00:25:48.964
And the most terrifying thing I hear is when a hospital director or a senior

00:25:48.964 --> 00:25:55.684
executive says, well, you know, a few fatalities are just the price of doing business.

00:25:56.184 --> 00:26:00.124
And they're not talking about OSHA statistics, they're talking about fatalities.

00:26:01.995 --> 00:26:07.855
They inevitably develop a mentality that, well, it's going to happen anyway.

00:26:07.855 --> 00:26:11.495
It's too difficult to get fatalities to zero.

00:26:11.995 --> 00:26:16.295
So we'll adapt and do what's next best.

00:26:16.775 --> 00:26:20.715
We'll be more efficient. But the minute you say,

00:26:20.915 --> 00:26:26.715
but are you more effective in the long run, then you begin to see,

00:26:26.875 --> 00:26:38.975
well, maybe the price of that fatality in terms of lawsuits and immoral behavior was not worth it.

00:26:39.255 --> 00:26:44.635
Maybe some companies should go bankrupt if they have too many fatalities.

00:26:45.155 --> 00:26:50.135
So level two is the answer.

00:26:50.335 --> 00:26:56.295
And the question then becomes, what would it take to get that middle manager.

00:26:57.035 --> 00:27:06.055
To create a climate for the direct reports and his fellow middle managers with

00:27:06.055 --> 00:27:09.375
whom he or she is competing for career goodies?

00:27:09.575 --> 00:27:16.635
What would it take for them to create psychological safety for their subordinates?

00:27:16.975 --> 00:27:24.855
The answer is their boss has to institute it in them, which means that their

00:27:24.855 --> 00:27:27.055
boss has to institute it in them.

00:27:27.475 --> 00:27:36.055
So the only answer in the long run is if from the very top you buy into the level two idea.

00:27:37.203 --> 00:27:45.523
Then make it part of the reward system of the organization, not a concept,

00:27:45.943 --> 00:27:47.663
part of the reward system.

00:27:51.683 --> 00:27:55.483
So what do you think? That's part one. Okay. That's only part one.

00:27:55.603 --> 00:27:58.063
Now, I don't know how much I need to describe or explain.

00:27:58.183 --> 00:28:01.243
You'll have to kind of tell me in the comments, but when he talks about level

00:28:01.243 --> 00:28:05.763
negative one, those are managers with no relationship to their people.

00:28:05.763 --> 00:28:09.903
Level zero is kind of the classic professional relationship.

00:28:10.343 --> 00:28:15.343
Level one is a much more personal relationship, understanding and knowing the

00:28:15.343 --> 00:28:17.643
whole person, family, kids, et cetera, et cetera.

00:28:18.003 --> 00:28:23.563
Level two is an intimate relationship. That's probably different than what we're talking about.

00:28:23.783 --> 00:28:28.583
So those are kind of the levels he sets up. What's interesting is how he's really

00:28:28.583 --> 00:28:37.183
talking about relationship building and how our classic sort of industrial age,

00:28:37.903 --> 00:28:44.083
Frederick Taylorism understanding of relationship building has been very separate

00:28:44.083 --> 00:28:49.063
and very sterile and how wrong that is and how it impacts the ability to create

00:28:49.063 --> 00:28:54.583
really this idea of trust and confidence. And those are the big words.

00:28:54.703 --> 00:28:57.303
That's kind of, that's my word, but we can, we can deal with it from there.

00:28:57.463 --> 00:29:01.563
That's part one. I bet you can't even wait for next week and yet you'll have

00:29:01.563 --> 00:29:03.683
to. I know it's, I'm a trickster.

00:29:03.903 --> 00:29:08.423
It sucks. That's it. You guys, part one is over. Part two is coming up. This is it.

00:29:08.823 --> 00:29:11.823
Have as much fun as you possibly can. Learn something new every single day.

00:29:11.963 --> 00:29:15.903
I know you did today. And for goodness sakes, you guys be safe.

00:29:16.720 --> 00:29:25.922
Music.

Transcript

WEBVTT 00:00:00.017 --> 00:00:03.537 Hey, everybody. Welcome to the Free Accident Podcast. I'm Todd Conklin. How are you?

00:00:03.957 --> 00:00:09.077 So before I even roll out the opening credit stuff, today is a big day. 00:00:09.197 --> 00:00:13.077 Actually, it's part one of a two-part big day. 00:00:13.377 --> 00:00:17.537 Does that make sense? Probably.

Enough. You know, enough. You'll be fine. 00:00:18.057 --> 00:00:24.677 I got to spend an entire day with Edgar Schein, and actually his son Peter was with him as well.

00:00:25.077 --> 00:00:33.257 And he was completely cool and kind of excited about us recording it for the 00:00:33.257 --> 00:00:34.617 podcast so you could hear as well. 00:00:34.817 --> 00:00:39.057 So that's what today's podcast is. Part one of a two-parter. 00:00:39.317 --> 00:00:45.057 Get ready because I think your socks are about to be blown off your legs.

How's it going? 00:00:45.040 --> 00:00:57.520 Music. 00:00:56.197 --> 00:00:59.897 Hi everybody todd conklin pre-accident podcast pre-investigate 00:00:59.897 --> 00:01:02.917 what is this called what are we you'd think after 500 of 00:01:02.917 --> 00:01:06.077 these you'd know what to call pre-accident investigation podcast that's 00:01:06.077 --> 00:01:09.017 it yeah i can't do 00:01:09.017 --> 00:01:16.197 it i cannot do it so you're about to enjoy the fabulous twinings of edgar shine 00:01:16.197 --> 00:01:21.937 fine get ready pumpkins it's good it's really good it's it's just such a treat 00:01:21.937 --> 00:01:26.877 to be to be with him and to hear him talk i one of my favorites i think i've 00:01:26.877 --> 00:01:28.397 talked about this before in the podcast one, 00:01:28.937 --> 00:01:35.177 of my very favorite things to do is be with these these academics as they enter 00:01:35.177 --> 00:01:40.677 the twilight of their careers and is that a nice way to say that yeah that's probably the best way. 00:01:42.117 --> 00:01:45.877 Because they've boiled away so much of the academic crap.

00:01:46.297 --> 00:01:50.057 So I don't know if you know, do you know the old joke about universities? 00:01:51.127 --> 00:01:52.927 People are so mean to each other 00:01:52.927 --> 00:01:57.687 in universities because the stakes are so low. That's the joke, right? 00:01:58.227 --> 00:02:01.807 The funny thing about academics is they're constantly sort of, 00:02:02.027 --> 00:02:07.287 the system is sort of incentivized to make everybody kind of an enemy.

00:02:07.627 --> 00:02:12.947 And what I love, and I got to see this with Edward T. Hall and just a whole 00:02:12.947 --> 00:02:15.447 bunch of incredible scholars. 00:02:15.847 --> 00:02:22.267 Ev Rogers was just a joy. is towards the end of their academic arc, 00:02:22.587 --> 00:02:26.887 I'm trying to think of gentle ways to say this, as they enter the next phase 00:02:26.887 --> 00:02:29.047 of their career and life, 00:02:29.347 --> 00:02:36.767 their thinking becomes so much more clear because they've sort of spent their 00:02:36.767 --> 00:02:41.727 entire career boiling their ideas down to these really quite remarkable statements.

00:02:41.947 --> 00:02:46.707 Like Edward T. Hall said, if you want to understand another culture, make a friend. 00:02:46.987 --> 00:02:50.747 I mean, that's an amazing, if you think about that, my life's work ended up 00:02:50.747 --> 00:02:53.587 on that phrase. That's a pretty cool phrase to end with.

00:02:54.267 --> 00:03:00.887 Ev Rogers was completely convinced at every level that communicating with one 00:03:00.887 --> 00:03:06.747 another was part of a larger system that involved really the whole person. 00:03:07.087 --> 00:03:12.047 And so we didn't communicate just in language, but we communicated in this entire package. 00:03:12.927 --> 00:03:17.327 And Edgar Schein has really boiled his thinking around organizations, 00:03:17.547 --> 00:03:19.267 culture, and safety to a great extent. 00:03:20.159 --> 00:03:23.839 Two words.

I'm not going to tell you what those two words are because you'll 00:03:23.839 --> 00:03:27.979 get to hear them. I mean, I could tell them. I know them, but I'm not going to blab them out now. 00:03:28.179 --> 00:03:32.419 I don't want to say spoiler alert the two words are.

That'd be cheesy. 00:03:32.959 --> 00:03:38.479 I just want to sit back and let you hear this conversation. 00:03:39.159 --> 00:03:43.299 Now, we're together with the folks at Chevron, and it was so sweet of them to 00:03:43.299 --> 00:03:44.639 invite a bunch of us to come see this. 00:03:44.639 --> 00:03:47.739 And we were talking about fatalities and serious injuries, which, 00:03:47.859 --> 00:03:52.559 you know, is a topic we probably need to spend a lot more time specifically 00:03:52.559 --> 00:03:58.479 throwing away the classic industrial safety conversation, the injuries and industrial harm things.

00:03:58.479 --> 00:04:02.139 They're important, but talking specifically about fatalities. 00:04:02.679 --> 00:04:07.479 And Shahika Korkmaz, who's a dear friend of mine, invited Edgar Schein. 00:04:07.619 --> 00:04:12.319 And Peter, his son, came with him. They traveled together.

and he spent, 00:04:12.919 --> 00:04:17.139 gosh, a good hour and a half. You'll see, because it's the reason it's two podcasts. 00:04:17.459 --> 00:04:25.039 Just kind of talking about safety and how the world works and what in fact is going on. 00:04:25.299 --> 00:04:28.659 And I think you're going to find this conversation to be really interesting.

00:04:28.939 --> 00:04:33.139 It's fun. It's really good. I think the very best thing I can do is not feed 00:04:33.139 --> 00:04:37.199 you more information about my exciting summer, even though it's dwindling, 00:04:37.399 --> 00:04:41.979 almost it's over. I mean, we're into bluegrass time right now.

00:04:42.159 --> 00:04:46.599 I think the best thing I can do is sit back and relax and listen with you. 00:04:46.859 --> 00:04:48.999 And you'll hear Edgar Schein. 00:04:49.299 --> 00:04:50.739 And Peter's going to jump in 00:04:50.739 --> 00:04:55.339 once in a while talking about safety and fatalities and serious incidents. 00:04:55.599 --> 00:05:01.399 So here it is, the Pre-Accident Podcast gladly welcomes Edgar Schein another 00:05:01.399 --> 00:05:03.579 time.

Sit back, relax, and enjoy. 00:05:05.919 --> 00:05:10.379 But it's a good lead-in to what what we want to discuss with you today, 00:05:11.886 --> 00:05:16.826 Instead of, you know, giving you a detailed analysis of how to think about culture, 00:05:17.086 --> 00:05:21.766 I really want to think about safety and improvement and effectiveness. 00:05:22.726 --> 00:05:30.306 My interest in this goes way back to the earliest organization development work, 00:05:30.306 --> 00:05:37.466 as some of you may or may not remember, was done in the oil industry. Exxon and SOChem.

00:05:37.646 --> 00:05:46.046 And those companies did a lot of, they put a lot of resources into their own improvement projects. 00:05:46.326 --> 00:05:52.486 They funded a lot of the management T groups that were operating in those days. 00:05:52.846 --> 00:05:57.326 Is Blake Mouton a name that still rings anywhere? 00:05:57.706 --> 00:06:04.466 They had a whole program that the oil companies were using for self-development.

00:06:04.686 --> 00:06:09.686 So it's interesting that that is not a common name anymore to you because at 00:06:09.686 --> 00:06:12.266 one time it was the thing to do, 00:06:13.066 --> 00:06:20.946 a self-administering one-week workshop that would work its way through all the layers of the company. 00:06:21.446 --> 00:06:24.506 And so anyway, it started there. 00:06:24.746 --> 00:06:29.446 And then as I started to be a consultant with Digital Equipment Corporation, 00:06:29.466 --> 00:06:34.506 they didn't really have a safety problem, but they have had effectiveness problems. 00:06:34.746 --> 00:06:41.686 And at the same time with Sibagygi, at that time, a big chemical conglomerate 00:06:41.686 --> 00:06:46.446 that then became pharmaceutical and is today Novartis.

00:06:47.266 --> 00:06:52.226 They clearly had safety issues, particularly with drugs. 00:06:52.626 --> 00:06:59.746 They produced the drug that produced all these unfortunate birth problems. 00:06:59.946 --> 00:07:04.566 So that's a very extreme form of a safety issue when you have a product. 00:07:05.504 --> 00:07:09.784 Produces something very undesirable and unwarranted.

00:07:10.404 --> 00:07:17.324 And then I got involved with Con Edison as a consultant for over 15 years. 00:07:17.504 --> 00:07:22.604 And that's where I've learned the most. Because when you look at a program like 00:07:22.604 --> 00:07:26.884 this as an outsider and don't look at a cross-section, okay, 00:07:27.024 --> 00:07:30.464 what are they doing right now? What is the current program?

00:07:30.804 --> 00:07:40.324 If you look at this across 15 years, you see all kinds of nuances that the cross-sectional 00:07:40.324 --> 00:07:41.964 analysis doesn't get you. 00:07:42.104 --> 00:07:44.284 So that got me very interested. 00:07:44.544 --> 00:07:50.084 And then I got involved around the culture issue with the nuclear industry, 00:07:50.364 --> 00:07:59.104 both in giving talks to the people in Vienna and then becoming a member of the advisory board of INPO. 00:07:59.244 --> 00:08:01.184 How many of you know about INPO?

00:08:01.584 --> 00:08:08.384 It should probably be most of you. It's a very ingenious device for an industry 00:08:08.384 --> 00:08:12.964 to create its own internal development organization, 00:08:12.964 --> 00:08:19.704 both to measure how we're doing and to provide teams that not only measure but 00:08:19.704 --> 00:08:22.464 then help to improve the organization. 00:08:22.864 --> 00:08:28.144 So for five or more years, I heard the stories of what was going on there. 00:08:28.504 --> 00:08:35.264 And they all lead to, I have about six points and then some handouts.

The first main point. 00:08:35.544 --> 00:08:38.704 It's a very simple point, and I suspect, 00:08:39.064 --> 00:08:48.504 I hope I'm preaching to the choir that the common element in all these safety 00:08:48.504 --> 00:08:58.024 and effectiveness programs is that they are all driven by the same two fundamental ideas. 00:08:58.464 --> 00:09:00.264 Openness and trust. 00:09:00.564 --> 00:09:07.404 If you look at all the safety culture lists, you'll always find openness and 00:09:07.404 --> 00:09:09.184 trust somewhere on that list.

00:09:09.624 --> 00:09:13.764 And what from our point of view, if you look at this culturally, 00:09:14.244 --> 00:09:21.484 they are not only the most important ones, but in a certain sense, they are the only ones. 00:09:21.824 --> 00:09:28.244 Because all the other things you do don't really work very well if you don't 00:09:28.244 --> 00:09:32.344 have people that are open with each other and that trust each other. 00:09:32.644 --> 00:09:37.564 So the thing I am most concerned about is that. 00:09:38.479 --> 00:09:41.899 We get down into the trees 00:09:41.899 --> 00:09:50.299 and redesign the trees and the gardens and fertilizers and burn-offs and don't 00:09:50.299 --> 00:09:56.439 look at the forest and realize that the forest only works because of the synergy 00:09:56.439 --> 00:10:00.979 between openness and trust and how people relate to each other.

00:10:01.199 --> 00:10:05.359 Is that okay so far? Can you agree with me on that. 00:10:05.639 --> 00:10:11.159 So the first thing we have to solve is the trust and the openness problem. 00:10:12.059 --> 00:10:18.759 So all the programs I saw in Con Ed, and every few years they had a new program, 00:10:18.979 --> 00:10:23.519 and the safety people said, if you don't have a new program, you lose motivation.

00:10:23.819 --> 00:10:27.799 And you get, That is, some of you have seen that. 00:10:28.219 --> 00:10:35.359 And what is lost in that is why do we need a new program every few years? 00:10:35.559 --> 00:10:37.099 Because there's something missing. 00:10:37.519 --> 00:10:44.099 There's some underlying thing having to do with openness and trust that hasn't 00:10:44.099 --> 00:10:49.139 gotten embedded in the culture, or else we wouldn't need a new program.

00:10:50.039 --> 00:10:56.939 So point one is that safety and effectiveness are fundamentally the same. 00:10:57.259 --> 00:11:02.319 And point two is they all hinge openness and trust. 00:11:02.659 --> 00:11:09.519 So the Stanford right now, we're working with the hospital and the medical school 00:11:09.519 --> 00:11:13.979 on a variety of lean programs and improvement programs. 00:11:14.879 --> 00:11:21.519 Safety isn't right now the big issue.

But what are all the improvement programs 00:11:21.519 --> 00:11:23.519 about and the quality programs? 00:11:23.759 --> 00:11:26.919 They're about trust and openness. 00:11:27.938 --> 00:11:35.318 So this convergence of effectiveness and safety is very important to get into your head. 00:11:35.738 --> 00:11:40.458 You're not working safety.

You're working total organizational effectiveness. 00:11:40.878 --> 00:11:47.158 Can you live with that? Yes. Is it taken for granted or do I have to sell it to you?

00:11:49.078 --> 00:11:52.018 I'm in. We're with you. 00:11:53.538 --> 00:11:56.578 But i i mean it is worth noting that 00:11:56.578 --> 00:11:59.718 the world doesn't necessarily 00:11:59.718 --> 00:12:02.598 see it that way you might have to prove to them 00:12:02.598 --> 00:12:05.578 that this is the right way for the organization to think about it 00:12:05.578 --> 00:12:09.918 but the world is still going to have all sorts of regulatory bodies that are 00:12:09.918 --> 00:12:17.558 only focused on on you know fatalities and accidents but ed's point as as organizations 00:12:17.558 --> 00:12:23.878 what are the benefits of thinking of them as linked, as synergistic. 00:12:24.438 --> 00:12:33.798 All right.

So now the question that the previous speaker of everyone asking you, 00:12:33.918 --> 00:12:37.758 what do you want me to do and how will I know how I'm doing are really fabulous 00:12:37.758 --> 00:12:40.058 questions for this very point. 00:12:40.318 --> 00:12:48.478 So the answer from our point of view is a high level of trust and openness is 00:12:48.478 --> 00:12:50.118 what I want you to achieve. 00:12:50.638 --> 00:12:57.398 And what I want you to do to get there is to develop a different relationship 00:12:57.398 --> 00:13:03.258 with your teammates, your boss, and your direct reports. 00:13:03.778 --> 00:13:15.098 All your human contacts have to go from something that in our books we introduce as level one, two, 00:13:15.318 --> 00:13:21.638 or three kind of relationship, where I guess we'll give you this first handout 00:13:21.638 --> 00:13:25.198 to explain what we mean by a level two relationship, 00:13:25.658 --> 00:13:32.418 that you can't have trust and openness if you don't have the right kind of human 00:13:32.418 --> 00:13:37.258 relationship, particularly with your direct reports.

00:13:38.282 --> 00:13:43.022 The most common situation that I encountered in Con Edison, 00:13:43.282 --> 00:13:50.082 I was part of a group, two environmental lawyers and me that were assigned to 00:13:50.082 --> 00:13:55.182 work for the board on improving environmental health and safety. 00:13:55.582 --> 00:14:01.362 But one of the things we did was we ran a lot of focus groups of electrical workers. 00:14:02.342 --> 00:14:08.802 And this was in the midst of Con Edison having, they were under indictment, 00:14:09.002 --> 00:14:13.042 they were on probation, so they had to work on this stuff. 00:14:13.282 --> 00:14:19.522 They were working very hard on it.

And so we would have a focus group and we would say, well, 00:14:19.722 --> 00:14:25.802 you have this timeout program, and so if an electrical worker is down there 00:14:25.802 --> 00:14:33.662 under the sidewalk and sees a problem and it's unsafe, you're supposed to call a timeout. Sure. 00:14:34.122 --> 00:14:39.062 Does it work? Well, most of the time it works, but there are some problems.

00:14:39.162 --> 00:14:40.062 Well, what's the problem? 00:14:40.242 --> 00:14:46.782 Well, one of the problems is I tried telling my boss about this wiring didn't 00:14:46.782 --> 00:14:52.582 look very safe, and I could tell that he was being polite, but he wasn't really listening. 00:14:53.342 --> 00:14:58.342 Something in that immediate relationship wasn't working. 00:14:58.662 --> 00:15:05.682 The boss wasn't listening.

Or he got annoyed with me because we were having too many timeouts. 00:15:05.942 --> 00:15:10.562 And his unit doesn't want to have more timeouts than the other units because 00:15:10.562 --> 00:15:12.862 they're measuring the hell out of the timeouts. 00:15:13.242 --> 00:15:18.462 So the measurement system under the transparency logic, which we're going to 00:15:18.462 --> 00:15:21.262 keep hammering is not the same as openness. 00:15:21.262 --> 00:15:28.922 Under the transparency logic, that supervisor is disadvantaged by knowing that 00:15:28.922 --> 00:15:35.202 he's got more timeouts than some other groups, and he kind of leaks that.

00:15:36.130 --> 00:15:40.610 To the employee, to the point where the employee says, well, 00:15:40.850 --> 00:15:47.310 this doesn't look quite safe to me, but I'm not sure I ought to call yet another timeout. 00:15:47.490 --> 00:15:49.210 You might get mad at me. 00:15:49.550 --> 00:15:57.310 So openness gets undermined in the most subtle way, even in the midst of a program. 00:15:57.930 --> 00:16:08.630 Or maybe what the what the worker saw is a deeper problem, a fellow worker doing something unsafe.

00:16:09.170 --> 00:16:13.110 And it's clear that the rules are you should report that. 00:16:13.470 --> 00:16:17.250 And in the focus groups, they would tell us, no way. 00:16:17.470 --> 00:16:22.870 You know, we're unionized. There is no way I'm going to report on a buddy.

00:16:23.670 --> 00:16:28.890 Just forget about it. That's not in the cards. Ain't going to happen. 00:16:29.790 --> 00:16:36.910 So again, what's the relationship between those two employees that would make 00:16:36.910 --> 00:16:44.950 them tolerate unsafe behavior because of another norm that's operating there?

00:16:45.090 --> 00:16:49.490 You never rat on a buddy. It's a very deep sort of a norm. 00:16:50.470 --> 00:16:58.830 So we've got to find a way to redefine the daily relationship between every 00:16:58.830 --> 00:17:04.510 boss and every direct report and every team member and the other team members. 00:17:05.490 --> 00:17:11.310 And the way we're doing that conceptually is to say the history of management 00:17:11.310 --> 00:17:19.390 has been way too focused on roles and role distance, 00:17:19.730 --> 00:17:21.850 that everyone has their job.

00:17:22.050 --> 00:17:26.110 They know what the job is. It's well described in the job description. 00:17:26.770 --> 00:17:30.310 And I'm your boss. My job is to supervise you.

00:17:30.830 --> 00:17:34.890 And I don't really want to get to know you. That might be uncomfortable. 00:17:35.610 --> 00:17:41.990 And yet getting to know you might be the only way to openness and trust. 00:17:42.950 --> 00:17:47.830 That's the big message.

And it's a very difficult message because I think we're 00:17:47.830 --> 00:17:50.610 fighting all of management history. 00:17:51.110 --> 00:17:57.890 Management history is wedded to the idea of roles, role relations. 00:17:57.890 --> 00:18:00.370 You know your job. I know my job.

00:18:00.690 --> 00:18:05.650 Let's not get too personal here because then it might lead to nepotism. 00:18:05.650 --> 00:18:08.270 It might lead to other bad things. 00:18:08.650 --> 00:18:16.990 So what we're trying to describe in that handout is how level two differs from, 00:18:17.442 --> 00:18:23.042 from both a really negative relationship, what we call minus one, 00:18:23.242 --> 00:18:27.502 or the traditional role-based management 00:18:27.502 --> 00:18:30.622 relationship that I think most companies just 00:18:30.622 --> 00:18:38.042 buy into willy-nilly and not saying we want you to be intimate and saying there 00:18:38.042 --> 00:18:44.662 is a level of knowing who you're working with relevant to the job that you're 00:18:44.662 --> 00:18:50.542 doing that you have to achieve if safety, effectiveness. 00:18:51.122 --> 00:18:54.042 Openness, trust are your goal.

00:18:54.462 --> 00:18:58.282 And the reason for that is the work has gotten too complicated. 00:18:58.682 --> 00:19:02.002 You can't define roles so neatly anymore. 00:19:02.362 --> 00:19:05.262 Back in the assembly line day, you could do that. 00:19:05.442 --> 00:19:10.182 But when you look at what, like General McChrystal's team of teams, 00:19:10.402 --> 00:19:13.262 when he says, you know, when you're fighting that war in Afghanistan, 00:19:13.282 --> 00:19:17.482 you don't even know what the right roles are until you're out there.

00:19:17.882 --> 00:19:23.962 Or another better example even is we've done a lot of work with forestry department. 00:19:24.422 --> 00:19:30.022 When you're out there fighting these fires, the roles are constantly shifting. 00:19:30.442 --> 00:19:38.002 The work is constantly shifting. So what you really need to know is what's your buddy doing right now?

00:19:38.262 --> 00:19:45.242 And if the buddy is also my boss and we don't have a level two relationship, 00:19:45.242 --> 00:19:48.322 I don't know whether I can trust him. 00:19:48.642 --> 00:19:54.082 And he or she doesn't know whether they can tell me what's really going on. 00:19:54.522 --> 00:20:02.642 So we're pushing this concept. And it's a tricky one because it's so against management norms.

00:20:03.362 --> 00:20:08.142 Psychological distance is a good thing. You don't want to fraternize. 00:20:08.262 --> 00:20:12.722 You don't want to have to hurt your buddy and rat on him. 00:20:13.002 --> 00:20:23.122 And yet, the world is going into a set of tasks and structures and work situations that, 00:20:23.681 --> 00:20:30.221 where the roles are shifting and unclear, and even hierarchy is beginning to 00:20:30.221 --> 00:20:33.021 be unclear, how to manage hierarchy.

00:20:33.441 --> 00:20:39.541 So if we're heading into that world, I think we have a solid argument that you've 00:20:39.541 --> 00:20:46.421 got to somehow get to know your people at a deeper level than what is currently 00:20:46.421 --> 00:20:50.081 the normal management process. 00:20:50.521 --> 00:20:52.141 How do you react to that? 00:20:52.801 --> 00:20:55.861 Dr. Strong, you said transparency is not the same as openness.

00:20:56.781 --> 00:21:01.441 So in this situation, I think I'm going to use those words interchangeably, 00:21:01.561 --> 00:21:02.461 but they're not at a stake. 00:21:03.621 --> 00:21:10.361 Transparency is usually a management-directed set of numbers that we all should look at. 00:21:10.501 --> 00:21:16.101 We should make it clear what work we're doing and how we're measuring it. 00:21:16.101 --> 00:21:20.781 We're not going to hide the ball, right?

We're going to share every metric. 00:21:21.381 --> 00:21:29.001 We might even share all of the performance measures of every single employee 00:21:29.001 --> 00:21:30.761 because we're completely transparent. 00:21:31.121 --> 00:21:35.921 But that's as much of a weapon as it is. It doesn't need necessarily create openness.

00:21:36.121 --> 00:21:41.661 No, I think that sort of weaponizes information, you know, 00:21:41.881 --> 00:21:50.501 because you end up with all of these sort of pathologies when you believe that 00:21:50.501 --> 00:21:53.721 that is going to really deeply influence performance. 00:21:54.781 --> 00:21:58.121 It creates new ways of hiding the ball. 00:21:59.421 --> 00:22:04.201 Because oftentimes, and again, And this is mostly speaking out of Silicon Valley, 00:22:04.421 --> 00:22:08.401 where there have been tons of experiments of this kind of thing, 00:22:08.521 --> 00:22:10.401 you know, the transparent organization. 00:22:11.481 --> 00:22:16.861 But it's a different philosophy, and it tends to be driven from the top down.

00:22:17.021 --> 00:22:21.461 We will be transparent. It's sort of cascaded down through the organization. 00:22:21.761 --> 00:22:27.561 That's quite different than openness. And we'll get into it more, 00:22:27.781 --> 00:22:34.901 unless should we?

No, I think let's push on with examples. 00:22:35.281 --> 00:22:43.781 I mean, the example I gave you of the electrical worker ending up saying, 00:22:43.781 --> 00:22:48.001 there's no point telling my boss, that's a loss of openness. 00:22:48.501 --> 00:22:56.721 Openness is when every employee down in the trenches who sees something that ought to be attended to. 00:22:58.481 --> 00:23:04.221 Feels psychologically safe to go to somebody and say, I'm a little worried this 00:23:04.221 --> 00:23:09.481 valve doesn't feel quite the same way, you know, as it usually does.

00:23:10.461 --> 00:23:16.661 Openness is creating an environment where that employee will say, well, I'm not sure. 00:23:16.981 --> 00:23:21.301 It's a weak signal, but I think I ought to tell somebody. 00:23:22.304 --> 00:23:28.124 That's what's missing, isn't it, in most safety programs, that willingness of 00:23:28.124 --> 00:23:32.864 everyone to point to things that might be going wrong. 00:23:33.264 --> 00:23:40.964 Because that's what often the accident review discovers, that there were all 00:23:40.964 --> 00:23:42.304 kinds of little signals.

00:23:42.784 --> 00:23:48.204 Somebody saw something that they didn't bother to mention. And had they mentioned 00:23:48.204 --> 00:23:50.124 it, the whole chain would have been different. 00:23:50.564 --> 00:23:56.824 At least in the nuclear situation, for them, that's critical. 00:23:57.224 --> 00:24:01.364 They can't afford to have anything anywhere not be mentioned.

00:24:01.504 --> 00:24:09.764 But even there, it's hard to teach everybody that it's okay to waste time to 00:24:09.764 --> 00:24:13.884 tell stuff that might be a very irrelevant, weak signal. 00:24:13.884 --> 00:24:21.824 So, where it comes down to where this level two relationship is most important 00:24:21.824 --> 00:24:26.704 and most missing, by the way, is in middle management. 00:24:27.084 --> 00:24:35.344 Because middle management is living in a world of schedules. 00:24:36.084 --> 00:24:39.104 Productivity, career competition.

00:24:39.104 --> 00:24:46.904 And so no matter how much the board and senior management says we really are 00:24:46.904 --> 00:24:48.924 concerned about safety, 00:24:48.924 --> 00:24:58.304 I could tell talking to middle managers that that was not really their daily reward system. 00:24:58.544 --> 00:25:03.324 Their daily reward system was not how many employees told them problems. 00:25:03.544 --> 00:25:07.344 Their daily reward system was whether they got the job done or not. 00:25:07.344 --> 00:25:13.484 So the schedule, and if you look at all the big accidents, all the Challenger 00:25:13.484 --> 00:25:21.744 and so on, it was schedule that was overriding the data that some of the engineers were providing.

00:25:22.204 --> 00:25:27.784 They had the data that the O-rings might freeze up, but the politics and the 00:25:27.784 --> 00:25:33.864 schedule and the reward system were at that point not about absolute safety. 00:25:33.864 --> 00:25:41.584 They were about, let's try it out anyway, because politically we'll run the risk. 00:25:41.724 --> 00:25:48.964 And the most terrifying thing I hear is when a hospital director or a senior 00:25:48.964 --> 00:25:55.684 executive says, well, you know, a few fatalities are just the price of doing business. 00:25:56.184 --> 00:26:00.124 And they're not talking about OSHA statistics, they're talking about fatalities.

00:26:01.995 --> 00:26:07.855 They inevitably develop a mentality that, well, it's going to happen anyway. 00:26:07.855 --> 00:26:11.495 It's too difficult to get fatalities to zero. 00:26:11.995 --> 00:26:16.295 So we'll adapt and do what's next best. 00:26:16.775 --> 00:26:20.715 We'll be more efficient.

But the minute you say, 00:26:20.915 --> 00:26:26.715 but are you more effective in the long run, then you begin to see, 00:26:26.875 --> 00:26:38.975 well, maybe the price of that fatality in terms of lawsuits and immoral behavior was not worth it. 00:26:39.255 --> 00:26:44.635 Maybe some companies should go bankrupt if they have too many fatalities. 00:26:45.155 --> 00:26:50.135 So level two is the answer. 00:26:50.335 --> 00:26:56.295 And the question then becomes, what would it take to get that middle manager.

00:26:57.035 --> 00:27:06.055 To create a climate for the direct reports and his fellow middle managers with 00:27:06.055 --> 00:27:09.375 whom he or she is competing for career goodies? 00:27:09.575 --> 00:27:16.635 What would it take for them to create psychological safety for their subordinates? 00:27:16.975 --> 00:27:24.855 The answer is their boss has to institute it in them, which means that their 00:27:24.855 --> 00:27:27.055 boss has to institute it in them. 00:27:27.475 --> 00:27:36.055 So the only answer in the long run is if from the very top you buy into the level two idea.

00:27:37.203 --> 00:27:45.523 Then make it part of the reward system of the organization, not a concept, 00:27:45.943 --> 00:27:47.663 part of the reward system. 00:27:51.683 --> 00:27:55.483 So what do you think? That's part one. Okay.

That's only part one. 00:27:55.603 --> 00:27:58.063 Now, I don't know how much I need to describe or explain. 00:27:58.183 --> 00:28:01.243 You'll have to kind of tell me in the comments, but when he talks about level 00:28:01.243 --> 00:28:05.763 negative one, those are managers with no relationship to their people. 00:28:05.763 --> 00:28:09.903 Level zero is kind of the classic professional relationship.

00:28:10.343 --> 00:28:15.343 Level one is a much more personal relationship, understanding and knowing the 00:28:15.343 --> 00:28:17.643 whole person, family, kids, et cetera, et cetera. 00:28:18.003 --> 00:28:23.563 Level two is an intimate relationship. That's probably different than what we're talking about. 00:28:23.783 --> 00:28:28.583 So those are kind of the levels he sets up.

What's interesting is how he's really 00:28:28.583 --> 00:28:37.183 talking about relationship building and how our classic sort of industrial age, 00:28:37.903 --> 00:28:44.083 Frederick Taylorism understanding of relationship building has been very separate 00:28:44.083 --> 00:28:49.063 and very sterile and how wrong that is and how it impacts the ability to create 00:28:49.063 --> 00:28:54.583 really this idea of trust and confidence. And those are the big words. 00:28:54.703 --> 00:28:57.303 That's kind of, that's my word, but we can, we can deal with it from there. 00:28:57.463 --> 00:29:01.563 That's part one.

I bet you can't even wait for next week and yet you'll have 00:29:01.563 --> 00:29:03.683 to. I know it's, I'm a trickster. 00:29:03.903 --> 00:29:08.423 It sucks. That's it.

You guys, part one is over. Part two is coming up. This is it. 00:29:08.823 --> 00:29:11.823 Have as much fun as you possibly can.

Learn something new every single day. 00:29:11.963 --> 00:29:15.903 I know you did today. And for goodness sakes, you guys be safe. 00:29:16.720 --> 00:29:25.922 Music.

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