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PAPod 535 - Reimagining Safety: Lessons from the Resilience Master

PAPod 535 - Reimagining Safety: Lessons from the Resilience Master

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PreAccident Investigation Podcast

The Pre Accident Podcast is an ongoing discussion of Human Performance, Systems Safety, & Safety Culture.

Show Notes

Join Todd Conklin on the Pre-Accident Investigation Podcast as he dives into an enlightening conversation with David Woods, the pioneer behind The Ohio State University's Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory. This episode unravels the intricate layers of resilience engineering and its foundational role in understanding safety, adaptability, and the dynamics of compromise in complex systems.


Listen as Professor Woods shares insights on building competent and extensible systems, avoiding the pitfalls of compromising on safety fundamentals, and the importance of reciprocity and adaptive capacity. With references to historical incidents and contemporary examples, this discussion is a treasure trove of wisdom for anyone interested in systems engineering, safety, and innovation.


Show Transcript

WEBVTT

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Fighting zombies and the zombies don't die they

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come back over and over again yeah and

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the zombies are out in force now and none of these things for example all the

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insane statements relative to the washington crash none of them are in a sense

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they're all old they're all things we've seen and fought and dealt, had to deal with before,

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but there's kind of a new intensity, a new,

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blatantness, a new, a new kind of misdirect.

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But again, it's as always, safety is controversial.

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Safety is never not controversial, even though we all want to pretend it is. Oh, my God.

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Music.

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Hey, everybody, and welcome to the Pre-Accident Investigation Podcast.

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I am your host, Todd Conklin, and it is so good to be with you.

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What a week. Oh, my goodness. What a couple of weeks.

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You know the James Reason case because this podcast is the origin of the James

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Reason podcast, so you know how that happened.

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The conversation didn't stop when we talked about Reason. In fact, it went on.

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And the great thing about this conversation is if you don't take a note in this

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conversation, I'm not sure I guess what would make you take a note.

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Because the podcast you're about to jump into is a sweet podcast.

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Oh, it has got lots and lots of content.

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And it's an interesting conversation, and I'm so excited you're here to be a

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part of it. I think you're going to enjoy it immensely.

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We're going to talk to David Woods. Now, David Woods is really the origin of

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something that's in The Ohio State University called the Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory.

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And we've talked before about this, and it's something to think about.

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Now, David put a series of videos together, and it's the easiest way for me

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to tell you how to find the videos, is just go to YouTube and look up David Wood's Resilience.

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And there's a series of 12 videos, and I think even more are coming.

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They're all pretty short, six, eight minutes, maybe nine minutes tops.

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Completely worth watching. You will love them.

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And I would start in order, but I would definitely watch it because you're going

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to hear kind of where the contemporary academic thinking is now from the master

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of contemporary academic thinking.

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There's just no question in my mind that they get no better or smarter or wiser

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or more just profoundly futuristic than David Woods.

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He's, Professor Woods is remarkable. And he's remarkable in the way he sees the world.

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And he's just consistently seen these things for a long time.

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And now he's at a point in his academic career where, and this is the best time

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ever, where now things are starting to kind of come to a sharp point.

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And he's got some pretty strong ideas. And he's going to talk a bunch,

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well, in the entire podcast today is about the fundamentals.

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Now, you know I'm a big believer in first principles. We've talked about it

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a ton of times on the podcast. If you don't have fundamentals,

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you can't have the next step, and the next step is applied use of these ideas.

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They're based upon these fundamentals. They support the theory and support the

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ideas, and much of the work we do, you and I do,

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is based upon these very fundamentals, and that's what those videos are brilliant in describing.

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Please, if you get a chance, and I urge you to make a chance,

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watch them because they're really worthwhile.

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Let's jump into this podcast because the great thing about when you talk to

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David Woods is you just need to get him started and then kind of sit back and

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take notes, which is exactly what I do.

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You'll hear that as we progress through, But I think you're going to find this

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podcast super interesting.

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So without any more ado, remember David Woods, Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory.

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And just go to YouTube and look up David Woods Resilience and you'll see these

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videos. Here's the conversation.

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It's just the three of us, you, me, and Dave Woods.

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So, Todd, why don't we talk about compromise? All right. Let's compromise and talk about compromise.

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Well, what does compromise mean in safety? What does compromise mean in systems engineering?

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So I want to tell a couple stories.

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One story is really simple. What do I tell people as they finish up their PhD

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or graduate work and go off into the world to fight battles over safety and

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design and the future and automation?

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And I go to them Hey look if you,

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If you never compromise, you're not doing your job.

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If you always compromise, you are not doing your job.

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The need to compromise is continuous navigation in order to push people further

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than their comfort zone.

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Because they want to retreat and retrench in what's familiar and comfortable when it comes to safety.

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And we see this in the reaction to failures I wrote about with my colleagues

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in the original Behind Human Error in 1994,

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which all emerged as

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soon as I hit the ground in the real world from grad school and walked into

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nuclear control rooms in the aftermath of accidents and started looking at accidents

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and redesigning control rooms to help operators handle accidents in the making.

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The pressures to compromise

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are we're there i mean i tell

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the story of walking in as you

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know i was still 27 years old i hadn't

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even made it to 28 and i am

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supposed to run a study looking at new post three mile island accident upgrades

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to the control room and we had been designing an innovative one based on the

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octagon pattern display to show you a dynamic picture of where are you moving?

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Are you moving away from the normal configuration for the operating context?

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How are you moving away? You got diagnostic cues.

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You had a big picture overview, an overview of health safety,

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what was deteriorating, what was recovering, what was stabilizing.

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And there were other approaches which were compromising.

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Instead of taking this as an opportunity for innovation. They were taking it

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as an opportunity, how to change it as little as possible. It was really those operators.

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It was really that utility, right?

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Second-rate organization, second-rate people, right? All of these things we've heard all along.

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And so the sponsor says, and I'm sitting in the back of the room and the sponsor

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goes, I know I'm the one who's going to execute, right?

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And the sponsor goes, oh, it's simple. We're going to compare different difficult situations.

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We'll look in this high-fidelity simulator.

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We can track errors and response time, and then we can do a statistical analysis,

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and we'll know if any of these new backfits really help or not.

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And I'm going, wait a minute. In the back of the room, I'm thinking,

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there's no way this will work. They're solving dynamic problems.

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There's thousands of variables. There's variations. By the way,

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when you run one of these things, depending on an action that could be correct,

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but exactly when it's taken, it's continuous change.

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Something can get worse. Something else may not be as hard.

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They may innovate and recognize something and act early, diffusing the situation

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before things get too far. In other cases, they may just be going slow and things

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continue to get bigger and bigger and more difficult to handle.

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They can misstep. They can missee. The information can be misleading.

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We designed misleading information cues into the scenarios.

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And I'm sitting there going, there's no way this is going to work.

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And I spoke up. I started to say, you know, it violates every assumption of

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these kinds of statistical analyses. And what was the comment back?

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Oh, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. Just go collect these numbers

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and run the analysis of variance, and that's it.

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And I'm going back on, this is a fiasco. I have to do underground research.

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I had to compromise and not compromise, because I knew down the road they'd

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be unhappy when I came back with null results showing absolutely nothing.

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It would have been boring and expensive with no information value.

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I had to create a different kind of study.

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I had to go back and invent process tracing for the modern systems and world

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from the history of protocol analysis in the early 20th century and problem solving.

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That was like chess, not how do you recognize unexpected behavior in a dynamic,

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complex, highly interdependent system.

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It's a little example. Now, think about human factors. Think about safety.

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What are we asked to do all the time? Compromise.

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What does everybody say? Well, you got to get your foot in the door.

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What do they say? You've got to reach out. You've got to touch them where they

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live in terms of their expectations and mental models about safety.

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And then you can start to move them. And then you can start to connect.

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You build it up. You get your foot in the door.

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So what did I start with as a joke in my 1999 presidential address for human factors.

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I said, you know, I've seen this all the time. I hear this all the time.

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You know, when they crack the door open, get your foot in there and then you

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can expand it and get inside and really help.

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Right. I mean, this is common.

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And I said, you know what really happens?

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It says they slammed the door shut. And then later when problems arise or accidents

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happen that have human factors, human systems, human automation problems, what do they do?

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They pick up your foot and wave it around and say, hey, I have human factors.

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It's right here. They lift their foot.

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So what does that mean for today and in today's context?

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Well, I have good news.

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The good news is what we started really, it's now 25 years since I first called

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for resilience engineering based on NASA accidents and investigations that occurred in 99,

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20 years since we had the first meeting on resilience engineering,

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is we've actually made progress on fundamentals.

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And, well, fundamentals, what's the reaction I get to fundamentals?

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Fundamentals, you know, they go, but those fundamentals, they don't show anybody

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what to do practically tomorrow in their organization.

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I'm looking at them like, what do you mean?

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I go, you know, nobody says, hey, you know, we've been building airframes,

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airplanes for decades. We know how to build them.

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Hey, this AI system, look at this wing.

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It's beautiful. And, you know, it's going to be great.

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This AI program generated a new image of an aircraft wing. Let's go build it.

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Wait a minute. Don't you have to take it to a wind? You have to put it together.

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You have to run some tests and simulation and the wind tunnel.

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It's a radically different wing. Oh, no.

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Aerodynamics is a solved problem. We don't need to do those tests.

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We don't need to do those analyses. You should be laughed out the door.

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Actually, today, I wonder whether you would still be laughed out the door.

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You should be laughed out the door, right? That's not engineering.

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That's not systems engineering.

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Yet that's what people who work on complex systems and safety are asked to do every day.

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You know, it feels good this way. You know, this is consistent with what we

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learned in an MBA program.

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You know, it would cost. Hey, that's not going to happen to us.

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Compromise. Compromise. Push it, you know, just make a small change.

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And you see this in what happened in the twin Boeing 737 MAX accidents with

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the MCAS automated system.

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And, you know, and then all these rationalizations and discounting mechanisms

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are out there in a case where, what did we do?

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We didn't listen to the fundamentals. We took safety for granted.

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It. We don't have to go back and test. We don't have to check.

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We don't have to make sure certain things in an integrated human automation

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system work. Do we understand what they are?

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Yeah, but compromise because otherwise it might raise some regulatory risk.

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It might delay the schedule.

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They killed 246 people.

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And then the other irony in this is it's cost them $30 billion and counting.

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I don't know where they are, $50 billion now?

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You know, the idea there's an economic case for safety has been blown up by Boeing.

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They said, I can save money now, so let's take shortcuts.

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Engineering shortcuts, safety shortcuts. And when it blows up,

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but they didn't think it would happen to them.

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It hadn't happened to them because they'd been taking these shortcuts for a

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long time. and their cumulative toll was building.

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So where do we stand? The good news is we have foundations. What's that like?

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It's like physics, aerodynamics, only it's for adaptive systems in this universe.

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Adaptive systems at a human system scale, that means technology is part of human systems.

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And we have fundamentals, we have laws, we have theorems, right?

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People always would say, where's your numbers don't you

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have numbers you know every time that

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happened to me when i started about alarms 1982

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30 years old and go

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okay let me show you the math for how how why alarms are misdesigned and how

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to do it better and you know what they said i didn't mean that math i don't

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understand that math and and and it gives a different answer than i expected

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and and if i to follow that answer,

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it'll cost me money. I'll have to do something different.

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Different. Oh my God, different.

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And so I said, wait a minute. You asked for the math. Here it is.

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Well, now guess what? We've got some math. We've got some advanced theorems. They're pretty weird.

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What do they show? Well, the world is inherently messy. The world is inherently nonlinear.

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All these compromises, is let's pretend it's linear.

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Let's pretend these are mostly independent parts. We can add in a few interactions.

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And again, this is an old story. This went back to the Lewis report in 1978,

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a year before the Three Mile Island accident happened, when they were asked to check on the accuracy,

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of probabilistic risk assessments on the safety of nuclear power plants. And what did they say?

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Basically, there's too many interactions and interdependencies, right?

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And it's hard to take into account the adaptive behavior of people.

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And so the only thing we can be sure of is that the analyses are an order of

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magnitude more uncertain than they pretend to be.

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An order of magnitude more uncertain, right? What were they highlighting?

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The complexity that's evident in our world everywhere.

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So the fact that we have laws, and yes, some of these you may say are provisional.

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Theorems can be overturned by new work.

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Laws can be qualified. Laws may be modified as we gain more evidence.

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But that's what the foundations are. That's our physics. That's our aerodynamics.

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And so I run through this and I go, and some of these are actually very simple.

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Let's take one. And we'll take one from social science first,

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because one of the differences about resilience as a systems engineering approach

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is that we take key ideas from all kinds of things that are non-traditional

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and don't normally talk to each other.

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Because that's what about adaptive systems in the human slash biological world.

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So let's take one, reciprocity. So Eleanor Ostrom gets the Nobel Prize in 2009

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for studies and work synthesizing the role of reciprocity in systems and human

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systems, human system scales,

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and how these things work to make systems that are adaptive.

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And that they can persevere over challenges, over longer timescales.

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And there's different ways to think about reciprocity. Well,

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it turns out in the fundamentals that a particular way to think about reciprocity is fundamental.

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So if you want to build a safe system, you need to build reciprocity between

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the different units, roles, and layers in your organization.

00:18:23.050 --> 00:18:28.590
Now, we see a lot of lip service to that, and we have always, right?

00:18:29.050 --> 00:18:33.870
But do you really build reciprocity? What does it really take?

00:18:34.130 --> 00:18:37.390
Now, we can describe that very simply. You don't have to know the theorems.

00:18:37.490 --> 00:18:41.190
You don't have to get into complex nonlinearities.

00:18:41.410 --> 00:18:47.910
You have to simply say and look at your system and say, where is reciprocity demonstrated?

00:18:47.990 --> 00:18:54.330
Where does reciprocity break down? how does management actually tell everyone

00:18:54.330 --> 00:18:57.090
that there is reciprocity going on?

00:18:57.210 --> 00:19:03.490
Or is it only ad hoc between horizontally between a few local roles because they're what?

00:19:03.670 --> 00:19:08.010
Committed to make the system work, fill the gaps, close the holes.

00:19:08.550 --> 00:19:11.330
Be the ad hoc source of resilient performance.

00:19:11.490 --> 00:19:18.290
So they find ways to reciprocate under stress in order to make the system work,

00:19:18.290 --> 00:19:27.750
generally in an environment that downplays or restricts or works against forms of reciprocity.

00:19:28.670 --> 00:19:33.550
And we can see this in successful stories of organizations that are highly adaptive

00:19:33.550 --> 00:19:36.290
to a dynamic world with changing risks.

00:19:36.630 --> 00:19:43.050
And so we can see these things play out. So it's very practical, But it's different.

00:19:43.510 --> 00:19:48.390
And that's when the compromise, the bad sense of compromise creeps in.

00:19:48.750 --> 00:19:54.430
No, we can't go that far. We can't do that. That doesn't fit with standard management practices.

00:19:54.850 --> 00:20:00.810
And what do they end up with? A slow organization that doesn't recognize things

00:20:00.810 --> 00:20:04.410
fast, that can't adapt quickly to changing circumstances.

00:20:04.410 --> 00:20:10.430
That's stuck in stale approaches in a world that is increasingly telling us

00:20:10.430 --> 00:20:13.850
about the turbulence and change that's ongoing.

00:20:14.190 --> 00:20:20.170
The thing we know for sure is that new kinds of challenges and shocks will occur.

00:20:20.530 --> 00:20:23.810
We don't know which ones, but we know they'll occur. Now, we know something

00:20:23.810 --> 00:20:26.310
about what makes such events shocking.

00:20:26.790 --> 00:20:28.450
That's back in the fundamentals.

00:20:29.050 --> 00:20:31.910
We know a bunch of stuff about how

00:20:31.910 --> 00:20:35.150
to be adaptive that's what's in the fundamentals do you

00:20:35.150 --> 00:20:38.910
want to put it into practice or do you want to say no no no no we're just we're

00:20:38.910 --> 00:20:42.770
just repairing a little bit over here that that's out of whack and a little

00:20:42.770 --> 00:20:48.350
bit over there and this discounting and narrowing that we wrote about in behind

00:20:48.350 --> 00:20:53.910
human error 40 years ago it's a 40 30 years ago 30 years ago 30 years ago.

00:20:55.378 --> 00:21:02.698
Plays out. So today's version of this isn't different than older versions. It's just that it's now.

00:21:03.198 --> 00:21:08.038
But the difference is we do have tools and techniques to deal with it that come

00:21:08.038 --> 00:21:09.238
out of those foundations.

00:21:09.518 --> 00:21:13.618
We have techniques to build reciprocity. We have tools that could help you tell

00:21:13.618 --> 00:21:16.278
whether you have reciprocity. Let's take another one.

00:21:17.138 --> 00:21:20.018
Saturation. This comes from engineering. It's in the textbooks.

00:21:20.238 --> 00:21:21.878
It's in the textbooks, for God's sake.

00:21:22.178 --> 00:21:32.298
And it gets ignored. But the textbooks try to hide and compromise away the implications that any agent,

00:21:32.598 --> 00:21:38.098
any system that's trying to control a dynamic, influence a dynamic world can

00:21:38.098 --> 00:21:39.698
saturate its responses.

00:21:40.038 --> 00:21:44.558
What does that mean? Hey, you got finite resources. The world keeps changing.

00:21:44.938 --> 00:21:48.998
Others are adapting around you. So whatever scale you're at,

00:21:49.058 --> 00:21:54.538
not just a control system, at every scale, this idea of saturation matters.

00:21:54.818 --> 00:21:59.658
What was competent can still be surprised.

00:21:59.958 --> 00:22:04.978
What was increasingly competent over before will get surprised because those

00:22:04.978 --> 00:22:07.118
limits will matter eventually.

00:22:07.118 --> 00:22:11.758
And the world will continue to throw events that surprise, right,

00:22:11.978 --> 00:22:19.118
the model you use to build competence or the changing model you use to enhance a form of competence.

00:22:19.798 --> 00:22:23.518
And there's a bunch of assumptions about the way we think about the world that

00:22:23.518 --> 00:22:25.398
turn out to be wrong and the fundamentals.

00:22:25.698 --> 00:22:31.918
So what's going on in the real world is the need to revise and reframe.

00:22:33.223 --> 00:22:37.063
And so we can talk about that. It's in the fundamentals. Can people do it?

00:22:37.203 --> 00:22:40.803
Yes. Is it hard to do? Yes. Do machines do it? No.

00:22:41.043 --> 00:22:43.723
Does anyone try to make machines reframe? No.

00:22:44.343 --> 00:22:48.663
So let's go back to saturation. It turns out it's universal.

00:22:49.143 --> 00:22:53.603
It turns out in adaptive systems, they adapt before they reach saturation.

00:22:53.823 --> 00:22:57.363
Why? Because if you hit saturation, your effectiveness at responding to whatever

00:22:57.363 --> 00:22:59.983
is going on just went to zero or near zero.

00:23:00.303 --> 00:23:02.763
What does that mean? That's a brittle collapse.

00:23:03.223 --> 00:23:07.863
Brittle collapse has big penalties. It's a step change in penalties.

00:23:08.203 --> 00:23:10.143
Could be an economic penalty.

00:23:10.503 --> 00:23:15.963
Could be a weakening of how your system works that will mean the next time it's

00:23:15.963 --> 00:23:17.363
challenged, it won't work as well.

00:23:18.303 --> 00:23:24.303
And it has costs right now. So biology wants to avoid brittle collapse.

00:23:24.463 --> 00:23:29.123
This is why I can summarize a lot of the resilience engineering as we build

00:23:29.123 --> 00:23:32.463
competent but brittle systems because we ignore these fundamentals.

00:23:32.683 --> 00:23:36.763
We want to use new tools and techniques that we're developing in resilience

00:23:36.763 --> 00:23:40.823
engineering to build competent and extensible systems.

00:23:41.103 --> 00:23:45.963
Yes, should you do work to build up new forms of competency,

00:23:46.263 --> 00:23:49.463
take advantage of new technical capability? Sure.

00:23:50.043 --> 00:23:55.663
It doesn't change the larger equation about how adaptive systems work,

00:23:55.783 --> 00:24:00.703
about how adaptive systems are challenged, about how adaptive systems can malfunction.

00:24:01.063 --> 00:24:06.043
Those fundamentals hold, just like aerodynamics holds, just like physics holds.

00:24:07.083 --> 00:24:12.383
So everyone needs to understand saturation, approaching saturation,

00:24:12.523 --> 00:24:13.983
what are the forms of adaptation.

00:24:15.264 --> 00:24:19.664
That can go on. There's some basic classes. There's opportunities for research

00:24:19.664 --> 00:24:24.844
to develop and understand other forms of adaptation that go on approaching saturation

00:24:24.844 --> 00:24:29.204
so that systems can be extensible as well as competent.

00:24:29.544 --> 00:24:31.804
Again, it's pragmatic.

00:24:32.384 --> 00:24:35.384
There's things to do, but it's different.

00:24:35.784 --> 00:24:40.504
Now, there's one other challenge for us, and that is it's not as mature.

00:24:40.984 --> 00:24:48.464
Why do people think about aerodynamics as or control engineering as easy and

00:24:48.464 --> 00:24:53.504
resilience engineering is, oh, we can't do that, is because the others are mature.

00:24:53.724 --> 00:24:58.924
So they've created very efficient tools, tooling and tools.

00:24:59.204 --> 00:25:01.824
You don't have to go back to first principles.

00:25:02.324 --> 00:25:10.904
You don't have to do custom craft work to translate laws into engineering practice, right?

00:25:11.064 --> 00:25:16.284
We have engineering practices. We have software that supports those engineering practices.

00:25:16.764 --> 00:25:21.924
But what do they tell us? They go, you have to fit the old engineering practices. You have to compromise.

00:25:22.364 --> 00:25:29.764
And you go, but those practices don't address the complexity penalties that arise as growth goes on.

00:25:30.064 --> 00:25:39.464
New roles, new scales, new interdependencies, a more tangled network of roles

00:25:39.464 --> 00:25:41.864
and interdependencies across layers.

00:25:42.504 --> 00:25:48.384
Tangled, hard to see, hard to notice where the connections are going to matter

00:25:48.384 --> 00:25:50.684
as the world continues to change.

00:25:51.444 --> 00:25:56.584
So we're not as mature? Yes. Are we different?

00:25:57.064 --> 00:26:04.104
Yes. Does that mean we're not actionable? Not in the least. Are you willing to change?

00:26:04.644 --> 00:26:11.484
Or are you going to stay stuck in old ways when the world is shouting at you?

00:26:12.064 --> 00:26:16.984
It's different. Your old assumptions don't hold anymore.

00:26:17.344 --> 00:26:22.844
You need to revise, reframe how you do things if you want to be adaptive to

00:26:22.844 --> 00:26:26.884
be viable in the world we live in now.

00:26:27.164 --> 00:26:31.964
You need to be able to synchronize across roles and layers, for example,

00:26:32.124 --> 00:26:33.464
by building reciprocity.

00:26:33.804 --> 00:26:38.984
You need to be able to be highly responsive when disturbances arise.

00:26:40.244 --> 00:26:45.244
And that means you have to understand how to adapt ahead of reaching saturation,

00:26:45.524 --> 00:26:51.104
whether that's about a mass casualty event in a hospital system or whether that

00:26:51.104 --> 00:26:58.084
is operating on a societal scale when a pandemic arises or when an industry

00:26:58.084 --> 00:27:03.304
is threatened with collapse due to economic and political factors.

00:27:04.327 --> 00:27:11.507
So the challenges out there really demand the foundations we have behind resilience engineering.

00:27:11.787 --> 00:27:18.087
They really ask to say, well, let's invest and build the maturity of these tools as we move forward.

00:27:18.347 --> 00:27:20.247
And let's not compromise.

00:27:21.287 --> 00:27:25.987
And I want to close by saying, and you can have the link, I wrote a preface

00:27:25.987 --> 00:27:30.927
for the report from our 20th anniversary meeting on resilience engineering.

00:27:30.927 --> 00:27:37.867
And it highlights a few of these simple points about what's a systems engineering

00:27:37.867 --> 00:27:41.967
area, even though this one is very different, that includes the human realm,

00:27:42.227 --> 00:27:43.567
organizational factors,

00:27:43.967 --> 00:27:47.527
other kinds of things we normally think of as separate from engineering.

00:27:47.807 --> 00:27:51.827
And that all gets integrated because it's about adaptation and complexity.

00:27:52.687 --> 00:27:58.127
And so it comes back and runs through some of these different points about how

00:27:58.127 --> 00:28:00.287
do you and when can you compromise?

00:28:01.007 --> 00:28:06.167
And what we have to be able to do in our field is recognize that there are certain

00:28:06.167 --> 00:28:08.527
fundamentals that say you can't compromise on.

00:28:08.647 --> 00:28:11.487
And we have to stand up and say you can't compromise on this.

00:28:11.647 --> 00:28:16.187
And if they want to go to some fly-by-night compromiser, I will compromise on

00:28:16.187 --> 00:28:18.387
anything if you give me the work.

00:28:18.627 --> 00:28:20.627
I will justify anything you want to do.

00:28:21.087 --> 00:28:25.467
I'll pretend it matters. No, no, no. We have real science.

00:28:25.667 --> 00:28:30.947
We have real theorems. We have real formal theories like how physics works only

00:28:30.947 --> 00:28:35.207
for the biological, human, technological, adaptive world.

00:28:35.447 --> 00:28:37.907
So you want to challenge them, challenge them.

00:28:38.327 --> 00:28:42.527
But you don't get to just compromise on them. You just don't get to pretend

00:28:42.527 --> 00:28:46.287
they don't exist. Sorry, we've made advances.

00:28:47.727 --> 00:28:50.427
So you've got to say how did you

00:28:50.427 --> 00:28:53.767
take this account into account in your engineering trade-offs

00:28:53.767 --> 00:28:59.667
not say i don't need to take it into account you need to do testing that says

00:28:59.667 --> 00:29:05.047
you're addressing these kinds of issues not say that's too expensive and this

00:29:05.047 --> 00:29:09.507
is too new or too different and you have to be willing to architect your systems

00:29:09.507 --> 00:29:13.587
in different ways because the way you architect systems now,

00:29:13.847 --> 00:29:16.147
in the technological,

00:29:16.647 --> 00:29:25.707
human technological, human organizational scopes, those layers are guaranteed to be slow and stale.

00:29:25.847 --> 00:29:28.947
They're guaranteed to become fragmented under stress.

00:29:29.167 --> 00:29:35.267
They're guaranteed to come to be poised to be for brittle collapse.

00:29:35.267 --> 00:29:38.807
They will appear competent over time.

00:29:39.047 --> 00:29:42.927
The statistics will look good while brittleness grows.

00:29:43.567 --> 00:29:46.887
And then there will be a collapse at shocks.

00:29:47.147 --> 00:29:53.827
But these are actually predictable characteristics of the way we build competent

00:29:53.827 --> 00:29:58.227
but brittle systems when we could have built competent and extensible systems.

00:29:59.115 --> 00:30:05.895
So the piece on this and the entire Foundations for Resilience Engineering video series,

00:30:06.215 --> 00:30:12.775
which I think you'll put the links up for as well, all of this is trying to

00:30:12.775 --> 00:30:18.675
highlight the fundamentals that guide practical action, the fundamentals that

00:30:18.675 --> 00:30:20.315
generalize across settings.

00:30:20.575 --> 00:30:26.575
They point us towards the tools and techniques that are starting to emerge.

00:30:26.575 --> 00:30:32.215
Now, granted, I don't have as much discussion in the video series so far on

00:30:32.215 --> 00:30:37.255
the techniques and tools and more examples of putting those techniques into action.

00:30:37.455 --> 00:30:42.435
But we have more and more papers that are available that illustrate them.

00:30:42.555 --> 00:30:44.475
And we're working on more videos.

00:30:45.095 --> 00:30:49.475
As you well know, post-production on these things takes effort and time.

00:30:50.195 --> 00:30:56.595
And we're all, what, nearly saturated. In fact, that is one of the hallmarks of modern systems.

00:30:56.895 --> 00:31:02.495
They operate under faster, better, cheaper pressure. They operate nearly saturated regularly.

00:31:02.835 --> 00:31:08.355
That doesn't mean you don't have periods that ease off, but the experience of

00:31:08.355 --> 00:31:13.775
approaching overload, approaching saturation, is regular and tangible to everybody.

00:31:13.775 --> 00:31:16.755
Right because what does everybody do if you're dealing with

00:31:16.755 --> 00:31:19.835
a friend and you're a little late and you're in your exchanges and

00:31:19.835 --> 00:31:22.975
whatever what do you always say i'm sorry but i had a period of overload it's

00:31:22.975 --> 00:31:26.555
like everybody's has periods of overload everybody's

00:31:26.555 --> 00:31:33.275
behind getting back on things why because new events happen which change your

00:31:33.275 --> 00:31:40.095
strategy for managing overload shifting things around and so we're all experiencing

00:31:40.095 --> 00:31:43.075
the dynamics of resilience and brittleness.

00:31:43.395 --> 00:31:49.495
We're all experiencing local adaptations in order to survive and the kinds of

00:31:49.495 --> 00:31:53.135
sacrifices, reconfigurations, reprioritization that go on.

00:31:53.315 --> 00:31:58.715
The issue isn't that we don't adapt, that there isn't some resilience. It's that it's ad hoc.

00:31:59.781 --> 00:32:04.201
And therefore, it will be insufficient and less effective than it could be.

00:32:04.481 --> 00:32:09.921
And that's why we need these larger layers of the organization to join with

00:32:09.921 --> 00:32:15.361
the rest of us in building adaptive capacity, enhancing our ability to demonstrate

00:32:15.361 --> 00:32:16.441
resilient performance.

00:32:16.841 --> 00:32:20.981
And we have plenty of examples from biology at different scales,

00:32:21.261 --> 00:32:25.281
from human systems, from cognitive systems, human automation,

00:32:25.501 --> 00:32:26.701
well-designed systems.

00:32:27.321 --> 00:32:30.901
They're just, the human technology ones just aren't the norm.

00:32:31.041 --> 00:32:35.121
The human organizational ones just aren't the norm because we're stuck in these

00:32:35.121 --> 00:32:36.761
old, stale beliefs. Yeah.

00:32:38.021 --> 00:32:42.601
Phenomenal. No, that was really good. I mean, that was phenomenal.

00:32:43.261 --> 00:32:48.981
Thank you. Well, I had to tell the old stories because I'm old. No, they need to be.

00:32:49.601 --> 00:32:53.581
That's exactly the conversation that the world needs right now.

00:32:53.741 --> 00:32:58.781
It's brilliant. Well, and we need this conversation in the context of safety

00:32:58.781 --> 00:33:03.161
and Jim Reason and past battles and compromises and, you know,

00:33:03.281 --> 00:33:08.281
how this cheese got, you know, is in some ways a compromise to help people understand.

00:33:08.281 --> 00:33:13.421
And then what happens is people deliberately take advantage of the opportunity

00:33:13.421 --> 00:33:17.461
to misunderstand, to diffuse it, to make it safe.

00:33:17.680 --> 00:33:23.760
Music.

00:33:24.621 --> 00:33:30.261
I told you you'd love this podcast. It is just one little gem of information

00:33:30.261 --> 00:33:35.461
after another little gem of information, and they all sort of add up to a big gem of information.

00:33:35.941 --> 00:33:40.481
More to come, because the one promise I got David to make with us is that we do this again.

00:33:40.641 --> 00:33:44.141
It is always so much fun to listen to him. Thanks for listening.

00:33:44.441 --> 00:33:47.101
This means so much to me. Thanks for being a part of it.

00:33:47.661 --> 00:33:50.781
Learn something new every single day. I know you did today. Have as much fun

00:33:50.781 --> 00:33:52.901
as you possibly can. Be good to each other. Be kind to each other.

00:33:52.901 --> 00:33:54.221
And for goodness sakes, you guys.

00:33:55.120 --> 00:34:06.744
Music.

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